

1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

4 Plaintiff,

5 v.

6 CRIMINAL:12-899 (DRD)

7 RAYMOND MELÉNDEZ-PACHECO,

8 Defendant.

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10 MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION  
RE: RULE 11 PROCEEDINGS (PLEA OF GUILTY)

11 **I. Procedural Background**

12 On February 26, 2013, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment against Raymond  
13 Meléndez-Pacheco, (hereinafter referred to as "defendant"). (Docket No. 26). Defendant has agreed  
14 to plead guilty to count one of the superseding indictment. Count one charges that on or about  
15 November 19, 2012, in the District of Puerto Rico and within the jurisdiction of this court, Raymond  
16 Meléndez-Pacheco, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, did take a 2004<sup>1</sup> Toyota  
17 Corolla vehicle, charcoal gray color, licence plate number GAT 071, Vehicle Identification Number  
18 (VIN) 2T1BR32E94C302519, a motor vehicle that had been transported, shipped, and received in  
19 interstate commerce, from Y.R.R. (a female adult), by force, violence, and intimidation, resulting in  
20 bodily injury, that is, the defendant cut and stabbed the victim's legs and right hand, during the  
21 commission of the offense charged herein, all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section  
22 2119(1).

23 **II. Consent to Proceed Before a Magistrate Judge**

24 On March 7, 2013, while assisted by counsel the defendant, by consent, appeared before the  
25 undersigned in order to change his previous not guilty plea to a plea of guilty as to count one of the

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27 <sup>1</sup> 28 Count 1 mistakenly identifies the Toyota Corolla vehicle as a 2004 model. The parties have stipulated that it is a 1995 model. During the change of plea hearing the defense waived any allegations of defectiveness in the indictment.

1 superseding indictment. In open court the defendant was questioned as to the purpose of the hearing  
 2 being held and was advised of: (a) the nature and purpose of the hearing; (b) the fact that all inquiries  
 3 were to be conducted under oath and that it was expected that his answers would be truthful; (c) the  
 4 potential consequences of lying under oath (such as a perjury charge); and (d) his right to have the  
 5 change of plea proceedings presided by a district judge instead of a magistrate judge. The defendant  
 6 was also explained the differences between the appointment and functions of the two. The defendant  
 7 consented to proceed before the undersigned magistrate judge.

### 8       **III. Proceedings Under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure**

#### 9       **A. Rule 11(c)(1) Requirements**

10       Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the acceptance of guilty  
 11 pleas to federal criminal violations. Pursuant to Rule 11, in order for a plea of guilty to constitute a valid waiver of the defendant's right to trial, guilty pleas must be knowing and voluntary: "Rule 11 was intended to ensure that a defendant who pleads guilty does so with an 'understanding of the nature of the charge and consequences of his plea.'" United States v. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d 1, 4 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1995) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969)). [There are three core concerns in these proceedings]: 1) absence of coercion; 2) understanding of the charges; and 3) knowledge of the consequences of the guilty plea. United States v. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d at 4 (citing United States v. Allard, 926 F.2d 1237, 1244-45 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1991)). United States v. Hernández-Wilson, 186 F.3d 1, 5 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1999).

#### 16       **B. Admonishment of Constitutional Rights**

17       To assure defendant's understanding and awareness of his rights, defendant was advised of his  
 18 right:

19       1. To remain silent at trial and be presumed innocent, since it is the government who has the  
 20 burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

21       2. To testify or not to testify at trial, and that no adverse inference could be made in relation  
 22 to his decision not to testify.

23       3. To a speedy trial before a district judge and a jury, at which he would be entitled to see and  
 24 cross examine the government witnesses, present evidence on his behalf, and challenge the  
 25 government's evidence.

26       4. To have a unanimous verdict rendered by a jury of twelve persons which would have to be  
 27 convinced of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by means of admissible evidence.

28       5. To use the subpoena power of the court to compel the attendance of witnesses.

1       Upon listening to the defendant's responses, observing his demeanor and his speaking with his  
2 attorney, that to the best of counsel's belief defendant had fully understood his rights, it is determined  
3 that defendant is aware of his constitutional rights.

4           **C. Consequences of Pleading Guilty**

5       Upon advising defendant of his constitutional rights, he was further advised of the consequences  
6 of pleading guilty. Specifically, defendant was advised that by pleading guilty and upon having his  
7 guilty plea accepted by the court, he will be giving up the above rights and will be convicted solely on  
8 his statement that he is guilty.

9       Furthermore, the defendant was admonished of the fact that by pleading guilty he would not be  
10 allowed later on to withdraw his plea because he eventually might disagree with the sentence imposed,  
11 and that if he violates the conditions of supervised release, that privilege could be revoked and he could  
12 be required to serve an additional term of imprisonment. He was also explained that parole has been  
13 abolished.

14       In response to further questioning, defendant was explained and he understood that if convicted  
15 on count one he will face the following penalties: a term of imprisonment of not more than fifteen (15)  
16 years, a fine not to exceed \$250,000.00, and a term of supervised release of not more than (3) years.<sup>2</sup>

17       The defendant was also explained what the supervised release term means. Defendant was also  
18 made aware that the court must impose a mandatory penalty assessment of one hundred dollars (\$100)  
19 per offense pursuant Title 18, United States Code, Section 3013(a).

20       The defendant was advised that the ultimate sentence was a matter solely for the court to decide  
21 in its discretion and that, even if the maximum imprisonment term and fine were to be imposed upon  
22 him, he later could not withdraw his guilty plea for that reason alone. The defendant understood this.

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<sup>2</sup>       Even though the indictment charges that "the defendant cut and stabbed the victim's legs and right hand",  
28 the parties have stipulated that the offense did not result in serious bodily injury. Accordingly, the maximum penalties advised  
are those applicable to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2119(1), which is the section explicitly cited in count one.

1           **D. Plea Agreement<sup>3</sup>**

2       The parties have entered into a written plea agreement that, upon being signed by the  
3 government, defense attorney and defendant, was filed and made part of the record. Defendant was  
4 clearly warned and recognized having understood that:

5       1. The plea agreement is not binding upon the sentencing court.

6       2. The plea agreement is an agreement between the defendant, defense counsel and the attorney  
7 for the government which is presented as a recommendation to the court in regards to the applicable  
8 sentencing adjustments and guidelines, which are advisory.

9       3. The agreement provides a sentencing recommendation and/or anticipated sentencing  
10 guideline computation, that can be either accepted or rejected by the sentencing court.

11       4. In spite of the plea agreement and any sentencing recommendation contained therein, the  
12 sentencing court retains full discretion to reject such plea agreement and impose any sentence up to the  
13 maximum possible penalty prescribed by statute.

14       Defendant acknowledged having understood these explanations and all the terms and conditions  
15 of the plea agreement.

16           **E. Government's Evidence (Basis in Fact)**

17       The government presented a proffer of its evidence consistent with the version of facts of the plea  
18 agreement with which the defendant concurred. Accordingly, it is determined that there is a basis in fact  
19 and evidence to establish all the elements of the offense charged.

20           **F. Voluntariness**

21       The defendant accepted that no threats had been made to induce him to plead guilty and that he  
22 did not feel pressured to plead guilty.

23           **G. Waiver of Appeal**

24       The defendant was explained, and he understood, that if the court accepts the plea agreement and  
25 sentences him according to its terms and conditions, he will be surrendering his right to appeal the  
26 sentence and judgment in this case.

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28           <sup>3</sup> "Plea agreement" refers to the agreement and its supplement.

#### IV. Conclusion

The defendant, by consent, has appeared before me pursuant to Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, has entered a plea of guilty as to count one of the superseding indictment. After cautioning and examining the defendant under oath and in open court, concerning each of the subject matters mentioned in Rule 11, as described in the preceding sections, I find that defendant Raymond Meléndez-Pacheco is competent to enter this guilty plea, is aware of the nature of the offense charged and the maximum statutory penalties that the same carries, understands that the charge is supported by the government's evidence, has admitted to every element of the offense charged, and has done so in an intelligent and voluntary manner with full knowledge of the consequences of his guilty plea. Therefore, I recommend that the court accept the guilty plea of the defendant and that the defendant be adjudged guilty as to count one of the superseding indictment.

12 Any objections to this report and recommendation must be specific and must be filed with the  
13 Clerk of Court within fourteen (14) days of its receipt. Failure to timely file specific objections to the  
14 report and recommendation is a waiver of the right to review by the district court. United States v.  
15 Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1986).

## 16 | SO RECOMMENDED.

At San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 28<sup>th</sup> day of March, 2013.

s/Marcos E. López  
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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